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Abstract
The paper develops general equilibrium conditions for urban models
with non-central production of a local "retail" commodity- The commodity
is produced by workers who commute circumferentially to work and is
purchased by consumers who make circumferential shopping trips.

Urban General Equilibrium
Models with Non-Central Production
by Jan Brueckner*
The standard microeconomic model of an urban area assumes that
city residents commute to the central business district, where they
produce some good. Housing is the only commodity produced outside the
center of the city, and consumer locational equilibrium conditions
require that the unit rental price of housing decline with distance
from the CBD. Locational equilibrium for housing producers generates
declining land rent, which, in conjunction with falling housing prices,
means that population density falls off as distance from the CBD increases.
Consumers in this simple model acquire a non-housing consumer good
at a fixed price.
The purpo e of the models present d in this paper it to increase
the realism of the standard model by adding irore structure to the non--
aousing consumer good production activity. The modification introduced
^Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign. This paper is based on my doctoral dissertation, Brueckner (197 6a) . I
would like to thank Richard Muth and David Starrett for helpful comments.
Any remaining errors are my own.
See Mills (1972) and Muth (1969) for detailed analysis of the standard
model.

was suggested by the apparent fact that consumer shopping trips are
short compared to commuting trips, with consumers travelling close to
home to acquire daily necessities such as food. Of course, shopping
travel for infrequent purchases of items such as consumer durables
may be more extensive, but this is ignored in the model. The models
constructed are characterized by location of consumer good producers at
all distances from the CED. Consumers shop "locally" by making costless
circumferential shopping trips to nearby producers. The production
process we envision is a "retailing" process; the output is goods sold
in a particular spot, while the inputs include goods produced by other
industries. Thus, shipping of the produced good by producers does
aot occur.
This paper presents two general equilibrium models of an urban
irea with non-central production of the "retail" commodity, which is
referred to as the "local" good. The first model has two classes of
.abor, one of w1 ich is the sole input i to the production jf the local
;ood, while the second model has only one labor type but adds produced
;oods and building space to the inputs required for local goods production,
he models impose Cobb -Douglas utility and production functions so that
nalytical solutions are achievable for functions of interest.
The purpose of the analysis is the derivation of general equilibrium
onditions for urban economies with the special features we have discussed,
o comparative-static analysis is possible because of the complexity of
he models. However, since the goal was to illustrate how urban econo-
ies with non-central production "fit together", neither generality nor

detailed results were desired. For th° development and testing of
a related empirically-oriented model, see Brueckner (1976a).
The next section of the paper contains preliminary analysis,
while subsequent sections develop the general equilibrium models.
I.
The basic assumptions used are the following:
Al) Production which requires labor input occurs in the CBD, and
CBD commuters live at every distance in the city from the CBD.
A2) Housing, h, and the local good, g, are the only arguments of
utility functions.
A3) The money cost of radial travel is exogenous and is increasing
and concave in radial distance, while circumferential travel
is costless.
A4) Local goods production requires labor input.
A5) Perf ct competition prevails in all markets.
A6) Consumers make the same number of commuting and shopping
trips per period.
A7) Consumers acquire the retail good at the distance at which
they live.
While some of these assumptions are in the spirit of the standard
iodel,. A3, A6, and A7 require discussion. We ignore the time cost of
ravel, because the principal results are unchanged when it is included,
he money cost of radial travel is T(k), where k is radial distance
ravelled, and T' > 0, T" <_ 0. Exogeneity of the function T requires

zero congestion at all traffic levels, which we assume, and requires that
the transportation system uses no resources whose prices are endogenous,
a requirement that our system, which uses no resources whatever, satisfies.
The zero-cost assumption for circumferential travel is artificial, but
in conjunction with A7 , it permits construction of a model where consumers
make "short" shopping trips with zero cost. In the real world, shopping
trips appear to be short compared to CBD commuting trips, but while
shopping costs may be small, they are not zero. Thus, consumers value
accessibility to local goods producers, and a realistic model must
be multicentered, with each local good producer a different center.
A3 and A7 generate short shopping trips while allowing us to avoid
the intractable multicentered problem that arises with small positive
shopping costs. Since shopping costs are zero, the need for A6 is not
immediately obvious, but it will become apparent below in the demon-
stration of the consistency of all the other assumptions. A6 seems
to be a natura" assumption, although s" opping behavior cc aid be endogenous
in a more detailed model.
We now explore some implications of the assumptions. If y Is the
number of commuter trips per period, 2yT(k) i" t(k) is commuting trans-
port cost per period from a residence at distance k. Al and A2 imply
that housing is produced at all distances from the CBD, and Al , A2 , and
A7 imply that local good production occurs at every distance from the
CBD. Al
,
A2
, and A4 mean that labor is locally employed at every k.
In a model with one class of labor, we may demonstrate that these
workers must reside at the distance of their place of employment,

travelling circumferentially to work and incurring no commuting cost,
as follows. The disposable income per period of a CBD commuter living
at distance k is y-t(k), where y is the endogenous CBD wage per period.
If the local wage rate at k exceeded y-t(k), all CBD commuters at k
would switch to local employment, violating Al. Hence w(k) < y - t (k)
,
where w(k) is the local wage at k. Competition among firms bids up
the local wage until it equals y-t(k), and hence w(k) = y - t (k) . Since
t' > 0, the wage of locally employed workers decreases with k.
We may ask if a worker will work outside the CBD and commute radially
to his place of work. Outward commuting yields a lower wage and extra
costs, and it will never occur. A worker will never commute inward from
L to L , < k < k , when
wCkj.) - t(k -k1 )< w(kQ.) (1)
which requires tCky-k, ) > t(kQ ) - t (k. ) . This inequality holds when
t' > and t" < with the exception of the case t(k) 5 Bk, In which
case equality 'olds.^ When transport c~sts have the latter form, consumers
are indifferent between zero radial commuting and commuting any distance
inward. Otherwise, inward commuting lowers disposable income and will
never occur.
Demonstrating that non-CBD radial commuting does not occur in the
two-class model requires using some of the results from the actual
2Consider the function x(k) = t(k+a) - t(k) where a > 0. Now
x' (k) = t'(k-l-a) - t*(k) < since t" < 0. Let a = k - k . Substituting
k = and k = k 1 in x(k) and noting x' < 0, we have tlk ) - t (1l ") <
t(k -k„) - t(0) < t(k -k ). The only way equality can hold f"
throughx this relation Is when t" and t(0) = 0, that is if
t(k) = Bk, 3 > 0. Otherwise, t (k ) - t (k ) < t(k -k ).
1 1
all the way

solution of the model. It turns out, as shown below, that the CBD com-
muters with the low CBD wage live in an inner annulus, while high-
wage CBD commuters live in the outer annulus. The lower paid CBD
worker type is employed at every distance since the local good is
produced at every distance. In the inner annulus, the local wage is
J2~ c (k) where y ? is the low CBD wage, and the above argument shows
that no non-CBD inward commuting occurs from residences in the inner
annulus. The local wage in the outer annulus is proportional to
y. - t (k) , where y is the high CBD wage, and the above argument also
shows that no inward commuting occurs with origin and destination in
the outer annulus. For inward commuting with origin in the outer
annulus and destination is the inner annulus, it must be true that
y<. - t (k-.) - t(k.,-k.) < w
n
(k
n ) , where k and k are in the inner and outer
annuli respectively and w.. is the local wage function in the outer
annulus. Since y - t (k ) < w.. (k , ) by equation (8) below, the inequality
holds if we use the above argument. Thus non-CBD inward commuting of
any kind never occurs in the two-class model. Since the local wage
is monotonically decreasing, outward commuting also never occurs.
The salient features of the models developed below are thus:
1) Producers of g and h locate at all distances; 2) CBD workers and
locally employed workers, who travel circumferentially to work at
zero cost, reside at all distances; 3) Both types of workers make circum-
ferential shopping trips at zero cost; A) perfect competition prevails
in all markets.
One question which might occur to the reader is: Does the spatial
equilibrium in the models developed have the property that people have

no incentive the deviate from the seemingly arbitrary behavior postulated
in A7? The answer is affirmative: the structure of the models is such
that the behavior postulated is A7 is optional, in other words, that
people have no incentive to deviate from the circumferential shopping
pattern. This is shown as follows for the one-class model. This
model is characterized by declining local good and housing price functions.
Hence, consumers will never travel radially inward to purchase g because
extra transport costs are incurred and g is more expensive closer to
the center. We can show also that outward shopping travel also reduces
utility. Let V be the utility level of a worker living at k and shopping
at k, > k • His shopping costs are given by t(k -k ), since by A6 the
number of shopping trips per period equals y, the number of commute
trips per period. His disposable income is w(k ) - t(k -k ), which,
from above, is less than w(le), the disposable income of a worker living
and shopping at k . Since the latter worker faces the same local good
price, a lower housing price, and has - higher disposable income than
the worker who travels radially to shop, his utility level, U (k^ )
,
exceeds V. But locational equilibrium in the model with circumferen-
tial shopping requires U(k ) = U(k
n
), where U(k
n
) is the utility level
of a worker living and shopping at k_. Hence U(k ) > V and the radial
shopper is better off shopping circumferentially at L. A similar
argument may be made for the two class model. Some other set of assump-
tions may generate a spatial equilibrium which validates those assumptions.
The attractiveness of our assumptions lies in their apparent realism

and in the sin^ licity of the models th. y generate.
II.
This section develops the two-class general equilibrium -nodel.
There are two kinds of labor in the city, both of which are required
for production of the CBD commodity x according to the firm production
function f (L , L~), where L is type-one labor and L is type-two
labor. We require that f.. exceed f over most of the domain of the
production function, guaranteeing that the value of the marginal
product and hence the wage is higher for type-one than for type-two
CBD workers. We can imagine that type-one workers are trained to
be managers while type-two workers are clerical or perhaps unskilled
workers. For simplicity, the CBD is assumed to be a point, reflecting
the assumption that CBD production uses no non-labor inputs.
Local goods production requires onfy type-two labor. We can
imagine that local production is a simple process which dees not re-
quire highly-trained overseers. The firm production function is
aL
, a > 0, < T < 1. Excluding ron-labor inputs leads to a stylized
model which is easy to manipulate and no less suggestive than a more
p l P 2
general one. Housing producers use the Cobb-Douglas function N I ,
where N and I are non-land capital and land inputs respectively.

The city exports x in return for N, which is distributed to housing
producers all over the city at the same delivered price n. For
simplicity we assume that the cost of transporting x and N is zero.
Consumers in the city consume the Loi i od g and housing h, and both
m
i
m
2
types of workers have the utility function g h . In this model, x,
the CBD commodity, is purely an export commodity. The number of radians
available for settlement at distance k is F(k), < F(k) < 2tt. Hence
the residential area in a ring of inner radius k and width dk is
(2n - F(k))kdk = £(k)dk. (Recall that local goods production is not
land-using.
)
Our first task is to derive the three price functions for the
city, p(k), the housing unit rental price, r(k), land rent, and s(k), the
unit price of the locally-produced good. We require that a CBD commuter
live at every distance k from the center. Since local production occurs
at every distance, local type-two workers must live at every distance.
Our approach will be to generate price functions which make CBD com-
muters of each type locationally indifferent in the areas where they
live. Since the CBD incomes of the workers are different, two different
sets of price functions are required. We then generate a local wage
function for type-two workers waich (a) makes them locationally indif-
ferent when locally employed, and (b) gives them the same utility level
as type-two CBD commuters. An equilibrium with both CBD commuting and
ubiquitous local employment of type-two workers cannot exist unless
both (a) and (b) hold.
The CBD commuter's Lagrangean is

10
g
Xh - A(p(k)h + s(k)g - (y. - t(k))) i-1,2.
The Lagrangean reflects the assumption that people acquire the local
good g at the distance at which they reside in that the relevant local
good price is s(k) and no shopping transportation costs are incurred.
The first-order conditions vield demand functions
m y
i
-t(k)
g = m
1
+ m s(k)
m y -t(k)
h =
—
f *
,.
. i=l,2 (2)
and the locational equilibrium condition
p'(k)h + s'(k)g = -t'(k),
which after substituting (2) becomes
m2-7oo +mi~Tao y.-t(k) ' 1
~ 1
'
2 - (3)
Assuming (3) holds at all k allows us to integrate it, yielding
m
2
log p(k) + m log s(k) = (m
1
+m
? )
log (y^tCk)) + A..
m m m +m_
p(k) ~ s(k) l = a.(y -t(k)) L , 1-1,2 <4>
1 l
A.
rfhere A., 1=1,2, are integration constants and a. = e , 1=1,2. Now (4)
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says that there are different price functions p and s which make the
two types c ' CBD commuters locatior. .lly indifferent. Rewriting (4)
m ni m.+ra
P
±
(k) s.(k) = a.(y.-t(k)) L 1-1,2
emphasizes this. The indirect utility functions of the workers when
they face the price functions which make them locationally indifferent
are
m, m -(m +m ) ,12,,vl2—± <<\\
m m (m +m ) a. . <.->>
We can identify the areas in which the CBD commuters live as
follows. It must be the case chat the utility level of a type-one
worker facing the prices in the type-two area (prices which make
type-two workers locationally indifferent) is lower than the constant
level in the type-one area, given by (5) above with i=l. If this
were not the case, he would reside j.n what we have assumed is the
type-two area, contrary to assumption. The utility level of a type-one
worker facing type-two prices is
m. a -<m n -t-iO y.-t(k) (mi
+ra
9 )
m
l
ra
2 <*i
+V a2 <y2 -t(k) ) ' (6)
which is found by substituting (2) with i=l into the utility function
and then using (4) with i=2. If k* is in the type-two area, then (6)
evaluated at k* must be less than or equal to (5) by the above argument.
This requires

12
y - t(k*) 1 2 a
(7^osy> *
:J
' (7)
Similarly, if k** is in the type-one area it must be true that the
utility level of type-two workers at k** is less than or equal to (5)
with i=2. This requires
y - t(k**) 1 2 a
( WVUJ ;> — . (8)y 7 -t(k**) a 1
Differentiating the LHS of (7) with respect to k*, we get
m, +m -1
y -t(k*) l 2 * t'(k*)(y -y )
1 2 y2
t(kA)
(y
2
-t(k*)) 2
since y > y„ . Thus the LHS of (7) is monotonically increasing in k*,
and the k* that satisfy (7) belong to the closed interval [0, k] , for
some k > 0. The same argument shows that the k** which satisfy (8)
satisfy k** > k. Since the city is bounded at k, k** e [k, k] . Thus
the type-two CBD commuters live in an inner annular area and the richer
type-one commuters live in an outer annulus. At the boundary k we have
m +m m +m„
a^-tOO) = a
2 (y2
-t(k)) . (9)
We can now derive the wage function for local type-two workers. In
the inner annulus requirements (a) and (b) above are satisfied when
w,(k) = y,-t(k). (10)
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The subscript 2 on the local wage indicates that it is the local wage
function for the inner annulus, where type-two commuters live. Satis-
faction of requirements (a) and (b) in the outer annulus occurs when
m m -(nyhi
. _
w
]
(ky 1 2
m
l
m
2 (
m
i
+V [yl -t(k) )
i
2
.m
x
m '(n^+m ) * a
?
\ (ID
The RHS of (11) is the utility level of all type-two workers in the
inner annulus and the LHS is the. utility level of workers receiving a
local wage w (k) and facing the type-one price functions in the outer
annulus. This implies
l/Cm.+m^)
W
l
(k) ' ^ (Yl -t(k)). (12)
*
Now a necessary requirement for equilibrium is that a, < a n , or that,
from (5) , the utility level of the type-one workers exceeds that of
type-two workers. If this were not the case, type-one workers would
switch to the menial jobs, violating our assumptions on employment
patterns. Thus a /a„ < 1 and w (k) •' y -t(k). From (9), (10) and
(12), we get w (k) = W- (k) ; the local wage function is continuous at
the boundary, as it should be.
Other locational equilibrium conditions must be satisfied as
well. The first-order conditions for the perfectly competitive local
goods producers are

s(k)axL^ X = w(k)
14
s'OOalJ w'(k), (13)
which yield
s'(k)
s(k)
w'(k)
T
w(kj" ' (14)
where
w(k)
rw
2
(k) o s k i k
w (k) k i k £ k (15)
Integrating (14) gives
s(k) = bw(k)'1
fb(y -t(k)) 1 i k i k
a r/(ra +m ) a
b(—
)
(y, -t(k))T k < k i k (16)
a
2
Substituting (16) in (4) we get
(1—c)u*i+ni2
1/m -m /m mo
a
2
^ b (y
2
-t(k))
pOO = i m-
a rao^+m,) 1/m., -m 1 /m
(~4 a
< k < k
(l-i)ra
n
+m..
1 2
' b C^-tOO)
k < k 1 k. (17)
It is easy to check that p and s are continuous at k.
P, P 9The housing producers maximize p(k)N SL - r(k)£ - nN yielding
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Pj_-1 P
2
p(k)p
1
N £ =11
P, P 9-l
p(k)p
2
N
L
SL
l
= r(k) (18)
P
1 P 2
-l
p
r (k)N £ Z - r'(k),
which yield
r'(k)
_
_i_ &-&;.
r(k) ' p
2
p(k) . (19)
or, integrating;
l/p
2
r(k) = cp(k)
We may summarize by saying that locational equilibrium conditions
generate prices W- , w
? , p 1 , p„, s 1 , s„, r , r„ with the following
functional dependencies:
"
2
(k
> ?2^ ; Wl
^
k
'
a
l*
a 2' yl^
p 2
(k, a 2> b, y 2 ) ; P1
(k, a.^, «2> b, y1 )
s
2
(k, b, y 2 ) ;
s^k, a.^, a 2> b, y^)
r (k, a
9 ,
b, c, y ? ) ; r^k, a.^, a^ b, c, y^.
All of the partial derivatives of these functions with respect to
distance are negative. Again, the subscript refers to the annulus tc
which the function pertains (1-outer, 2-inner). Substituting prices
into the demand functions (2) we get
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m y2
-t(k) m
±
b
±
(y -t<k)r = g„(k,b,y )B2 m
1
+m
2
s
2
(k,b,y
2
) iij-hii,
w 2 fa 2
m y.-t(k) ro -1/m, m fa (T-l)m. fa
h = —f 7? -r r = __|_ a ib 1 ^(y 9 -t(k>)
2 m i
+m
2 P2^ »
a2' 'y2' ml 2
= h
2
(k,a
2
,b,y
2
) (22)
as the demand functions for residents of the inner annulus. Similarly,
we get g21
(k, a , a? , b, y ) and b <k, a1> a2 , b, y^ as demand fimc-
•--•-.ns for the type-one residents of the outer annulus. Substituting
prices and w in place of y - t (k) in (2) , we get g,„(k, a , a„ , b, y.
)
and h „(k, a , a„ , b, y ) as demand functions of local workers living
in the outer annulus. Housing output per unit land from (18) is
r.(k)/p p.(k) in the ith annulus, and per capita land consumption is
the product of this expression and per capita housing consumption, or
mp y -t(k) cm2 p 2
~p 2^m2 p 9mj/m2 (m (l-p 2 )-p 2 (l-Ora., , ,
: 7TT— = ; 3^ b ' (y„-t(k))
m +u, r (k) id +rc, 2
= £-
2
(k, a
2
, b, c, y )
Similarly, the per capita land consumption of type-one and type-two
workers in the outer annulus is
J6
L1
(k, a , a2> b, c, y^
«-
]2 ^
k
»
a
i'
a2' b ' c ' yi^
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>m (18) the ratio of non-land capital to land in the hour
Industry iu the inner annuius is
p r O. a
2
, b, c, y )
.
Y (k. a , b, c, y )
p .-. n *- /. i
S nilarly, this ratio in the outer sector is
p 1 r (k, a 1
, a
2
, b, c, y^)
Yl (k, ar a2 , b, c. 7l).
We now proceed to calculate patterns of local employment wh
Tiate supply and demand for local goods in every ring. In the ring
with inner radius k for < k < k, the demand for the local good is
E(k) g2 (k, b, y2 >
2
2
(k, a2> b, c, y2 )
'
Ls l al land area Ln the ring, c(k)ti"-, divided by pe/
cap^ uiaptj.cn I , which equals population in the ring, times
per . i .. .. demand for g. This d tnd nsen Ltive to the mix of
locai aac - - . . . :e the inner annuius their disposable
i p cicing local goods at dis-
tance - e inner annuius is n (k) , ind for < k < k, this function
ify
n
2
(k) ctL
2
dk =
-f- dk,
(2 J)
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where L is the optimal labor input for a local goods firm. Equation
(23) says that the supply of the lucal good in the ring must equal
demand for it. Now the volume of local employment in the ring which
generates an output such that demand is satisfied is n,(k)L dk. The
proportion of ring residents locally employed which leads to the clearing
of the local goods market is thus
n (k)L,dk
e =
-? ^— (24)
2
since the denominator equals the ring population. Substituting for the
n (k) solution from (23) above, we get
(25)
aL
2-
Substituting for aL "" from (13) We have
s„g„ xm
1
T— = —~ < 1, (26)W
2
m
i 2
since budget shares are constant with a Cobb-Douglas utility function
from (2). Thus, a constant fraction e of the residents in any ring
in the inner annulus is engaged in local employment, and e£(k)dk of
the land is occupied by the residences of local workers.
Solving for the distribution of population between local
employees and CBD commuters in the outer annulus is more complicated
because the population mix does affect demand for local goods as a
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result of the unequal incomes of the two types of workers. Let 9 be the
proportion of residential land occupied by local workers in a ring ia
the outer annulus. Then the demand for g in the ring is
9C(k)gl2 (k,a 1 ,a2 ,b,y1 ) (l-e)£(k)gi;L(k.a^a^b.y^
£12 (k,
a^a ,b, c.y^ ^(k.a^a^b.c.y^
Now all the type-two labor in the ring must be used by local firms.
The number of local firms is thus equal to total type-two labor divided
by the optimal labor input per firm, or
esQQdk
n.(k) = p . (28)
1 L
2
Since n (k)aL must equal (27) we have, using (28) and (13),
x-1 9£(k) e€(k)g (l-8)5(k)gT Vt,(K
m 1/ 11 (29)
*12 12 ""ll
Sll
o
'11 1
W
1
+ rt (rs7 - »i2>11 12
Now since x < 1 and SiS, ->/". = m
-i^m -['Hn j from ^ 2 ^ > the expression in
parentheses in (29) is positive and < 9 < 1. Noting the functional
dependencies of the variables on the RHS of (29), we have
6 - 9(k, a
±
, a
2
, b, c, yp. (30)
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Unlike in the inner annulus, the fraction of residential land occupied
by locally employed workers does Vary over distance. It should be
noted that the above analysis ignores the fact that n.. and n_ must
be integer-valued.
What kind of market forces bring about an allocation of labor
to local goods production which clears the local goods market at every
distance? In each ring in the inner annulus, there is a perfectly
elastic supply of local labor to the market for local workers at the
wage rate w
?
since CBD workers are indifferent between local and CBD
employment. Suppose there were an excess demand for local goods in the
ring, that is, not enough labor locally employed. There would be upward
r .7ure on the price of the local good in the ring resulting in entry
of firms. The bidding of firms for a total amount of labor inadequate
to supply each firm with its optimal labor input would put upward
pressure on the local wage rate, causing reallocation of labor from CBD
to local employment. This process would continue until the local goods
market cleared, relieving upward pressure on the local good price and
the local wage.
Inadequate local employment in a ring in the outer annulus would
cause upward pressure on the local good price, entry of firms, and
upward pressure on the local wage rate. Workers must be attracted
from some other ring to restore equilibrium, and these workers must bid
away housing from type-one workers in the ring in order to establish
residences. An infinitesimal temporary increase in the local wage may
allow this.
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We may now discuss general equilibrium in this model. The
exogenous variables in the model are the populations of the two groups
in the city L.. , L_ , the agricultural rent r , the unit prices of x and
N, v and n respectively (the assumption that x is imported in exchange
for N means these prices must be set in external markets, and the city
is assumed to be a price taken in these markets) , and the profit
levels iTr and it., in the local goods and housing industries. (A more
satisfactory profit constraint would be zero profits, but the homo-
geneous production functions employed above for their analytical useful-
ness rule out this assumption.) The question of the expenditure of
profits by the firm owners fortunately does not arise with a zero profit
constraint. To eliminate the complication of how positive profits get
spent in this model, we assume firm owners live outside the city. In
addition, we assume that the landowners who receive the urban land rent
also live outside the city. A model incorporating expenditures on
housing and local goods in the city by rentiers and capitalists could be
developed without difficulty, although the gains from this additional
complexity would be marginal.
From (13) and (18), the profit levels of local goods and housing
producers are respectively
1/1-x
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G
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p /1-p -p p./l-p -p
-
H
(c) - (1 - 1
~ p2 ) (Pl
/n) J ' (p
2
/c)
(32)
We may now develop general equilibrium conditions for the model.
Let J be the number of x-producing firms in the CBD and let L.. and L„
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be the inputs of the two labor types in each firm. Equilibrium condi-
tions for the x sector are
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The first two equations state that firm labor inputs are profit
maximizing given the wage rates the firm faces, which are themselves
endogenous. The third equation is a trade balance equation which states
that the value of x production equals the value of N consumed by the
housing industry. The integrands on the RHS of (35) are residential
land times non-land capital per unit land, or non-land capital used in
a ring of radius k. Equation (36) states that each firm employs the
same amount of type-one labor, and that total employment exhausts the
supply L . The last equation states that each firm employs the same
amount of type-two labor, and that total CBD employment of type-two
labor equals the number of type-two CBD commuters (remember that l-e of
the population in each ring in the inner annulus commutes to the CBD, and
hence that l-e of the total inner annulus population, which is the
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integral in (37), commutes to the CBD) . There is no zero- or constant-
profit condition for x producers because such a condition is already
built into the external solution for the price v..
Profit conditions for local goods and housing producers are
ir
G
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(38)
V c) = V (39)
Conditions which guarantee that the city is able to house each
group of workers are
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where L and L are type-one and type-two populations. Boundary
conditions are
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(42)
tfhich says that urban land rent must just equal agricultural rent, r ,
A.
at the periphery of the urban area, and
„
m^-Hou
a
1 (y 1 -t(k)) = a2 (y2 -t(k))
m1+m2 (43)
</hich was developed above.
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The unknowns in the model are the integration constants a
1
, a ,
b, c; the income levels y , y ; the number of CBD firms and their labor
inputs J, L. , L„ ; and the boundary distances k and k. There are eleven
variables and we have eleven equations above to solve for them. We
can solve directly for b and c in (38) and (39) , reducing the system to
a fully simultaneous nine-equation system with nine unknowns.
It should be noted that hidden requirements for the consistency
of the above system are y > y~ , which guarantees that the model is
not constructed backwards, a < a , which guarantees that type-one
workers cannot gain by switching to type-two jobs, and y - t(k) > 0,
which guarantees that no one in the city spends an amount greater than
or equal to his income on commuting expenses (y - t(k) > implies that
y
1
- t(k) > in the outer annulus, which by (43) guarantees y„ - t(k) >
in the inner annulus). We also require positive values for all the
endogenous variables.
The model implicitly assumes that firms are free to migrate
between cities through the constant profit conditions for producers.
However, allowing a and a~ to be solved for in the city means that
utility levels are unrelated to those prevailing outside the urban
area. In other words, the above model implicitly allows firm migration
without allowing worker migration. An easy modification which frees
workers to migrate is to set a = a and a_ - a and make L. and L
endogenous. Then population will adjust until the utility levels of
both groups equal prevailing utility levels in the economy at large.
While comparative-static analysis using this model is possible
in principle, pencil-and-paper results are out of the question in a
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practical sense because of the large number of equations. The only
ways of investigating the sensitivity of the model solution to varia-
tions in the exogenous variables would be to conduct computer solutions
using specific numerical values for parameters and exogenous variables.
Interesting exercises would be an examination of the effect of a
change in the population of one group on the wages and utility levels
of both groups and an examination of how a change in the exogenous
utility level of one group in the mobile-worker model effects popula-
tion and wages for both groups.
Since the purpose of this model has been to illustrate the
structure of an urban economic model with local goods, the lack of
comparative static results is defensible. We have shown how incomes,
utility levels, boundary configurations, and patterns of labor allocation
are all endogenous ly determined in a complete model of an urban area. The
lesson to be drawn from this kind of model is that partial equilibrium
urban economic analysis may ignore complex and important general
equilibria effects.
III.
The model developed in this section is similar to the one
explored above, but its emphasis is different. The local goods sector
now uses local labor, a produced input Q, which can be thought of as
"wholesale goods," and commercial real estate R, or "store space."
Like housing producers, the producers of commercial real estate use
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land and non-land capital as inputs, but they produce a distinctly
different product. Local goods production uses land in this model
since land is embodied in its R input. We dispense with the complica-
tions introduced by multiple income groups by assuming all workers are
identical. While the clearing of the local goods market in the previous
model required the proper division of workers between local and CBD
employment in a given ring, it turns out that the proper division of
land between local goods and housing producers guarantees market clearing
in the model developed below.
We assume that the produced input Q is manufactured in the CBD.
Output must satisfy the city's demand for Q and pay for imports of N
used by housing and commercial real estate producers.
The utility and housing production functions are the same as
those above, while the production functions for commercial real estate
and local goods are
M
P
1 ^R = N £
G = Q ^L ZR . (44)
Utility maximization again results in the demand equations (2) and
the locational equilibrium condition
m m m
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Housing producer equilibrium again results in
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p2
p(k) = cr(k) \ (46)
and commercial real estate producer equilibrium yields the analogous
condition
U
2
z(k) = dr(k) % (47)
where z is the unit rental price of R and d is an integration constant.
Local goods producers solve
G nsg
L q
- q =
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Sg
3 R "
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°
s'G - w'L - z'R = 0, (48)
where q is the unit price of Q, which is invariant over space by
assumption. Dividing the last equation in (48) by R and substituting
from the first three equations, we have
s'(k ) w T (k) zUXl
- n
s(k) " 8 2 w(k) 8 3 z(k)
which after integration yields
g g
s(k) = bw(k) 2 z(k) 3
,
(49)
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where b is an integration constant. Now (45)} (46) y (47),, and (49)
form a non-linear equation system in the five prices, which may be
solved for all the prices in terms of w. The solution is
c
r = r (a,b,:,d)w(k)
y 2
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z = z (a,b,c,d)w(k)
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Substituting (50) into the demand equations (2) gives us demand functions
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g(k,a,b,c,d,y)
h(k,a,b,c,d,y). (51)
As above, per capita land consumption is h times the inverse of housing
output per unit land from (18) f or
£(k,a,b,c,d,y).
The ratios of non-land capital to land in housing and commercial real
estate are, respectively,
PjT
P 2
n 'H
= Yu (k,a,b,c,d,y)
—
-
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(k,a,b,c,d,y). ( 52 >
M nn k
The ratio of commercial real estate output per unit land input from a
system analogous to (]«; is
—
—
= <j(k,a,b,c,d,y)
u 2 P
The ratios of Q input, G output, and L input to land used in the G
industry are, respectively,
or rr
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g 2
<7> " (fe * = — * = 6,(k,a,b,c,d,y), (53)
* g R g3
w
where the expressions following the second set of equality signs come
from (48).
Let A be the fraction of available land used to produce local
goods, that is, the fraction used by producers of commercial real
estate. In order that the market for local goods clear in a ring at
distance k, it must be true that
ic/v\a ck a k n a „^v (1-A)g(k)g(k,a,b,c,d,y) ,, (54)AC(k)6
2
(b, ,b,c,d,y)dk
-
^k.a.bU.d.y) dk '
The LHS of (54) is land used for local goods production times local
goods output per unit land input, or total local goods output in the
ring. The RHS is residential land divided by per capita land consump-
tion, which equals ring population times per capita demand for the
local good. The equality requires that output of local goods equal
demand for them. Hence
A = — = A(k,a,b,c,d,y) (55)
f +6 2
is the fraction of land devoted to local goods production which
guarantees market equilibrium at every distance. A.s before, a constant
fraction of the ring labor force works locally. The fraction is
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which, using (55), (53), and (2), reduces to e = g„m /m + m .
Ring equilibrium comes about as in the previous model. Excess
demand for local goods bids up the price of commercial real estate
as local goods producers enter in response to an increased unit price
for their output. This induces increased output of commercial real
estate as new firms enter. These firms must bid land away from housing
producers. Labor flows to the expanding local goods sector as local
wages threaten to rise.
Profits for housing producers are irH (c) as in (32) while profits
for commercial real estate producers are analogously tt (d). Now local
R
goods producers' profits are
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We may now characterize general equilibrium. The conditions
on CBD production are as follows:
qf'(L) = y (56)
Jqf(L) =
k
{A(q5
1
(k,a,b,c,d,y) + nYR (k,a,b,c,d,y))
+ (l-A)nY
H
(k,a,b,c,d,y)) £(k)dk (57)
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L = (1 Y>
£ (58)
The first condition says that the competitive Q producers, whose produc-
tion function is f, maximize profits in their choice of labor input L.
The second condition says that the value of Q production equals the
value of the Q used in the city, corresponding to the first term in
the integral, plus the value of N imported from the outside, which
corresponds to the last two terms in the integral. Again we assume
transport costs for N and Q are zero. The third condition states that
each firm employs 1/J of the labor commuting to the CBD, which is just
equal to 1 - e of the population of the urban area. Above, we have
omitted the arguments of a.
We also have the requirement that the city house its population,
k
ui
1
'*^
,
" " £ , (59)£(k,a,b,c,d,y)
as well as the boundary condition
c
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We also have the three profit conditions
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Solving (58) aid (61) - (63) and substituting the solutions for
b, c, d, and L into the rest of the system reduces it to a four-equation
system in the five unknowns, a, y, J, k. Again, comparative statics
results are impract. cab , but computer solution of the model may provide
useful insights.
The model illustrates that a more complicated sectoral break-
down of the urban economy is possible and interesting. Indeed, a
model which incorporates a land-using local goods sector as well as
different types of labor could be constructed, escalating the level of
realism even further. The local goods market equilibrium requirements
for such a model would involve simultaneously determining land and
labor allocation to the local goods sector in rings where different
s of labor cohabit. The separate models, however, amply illustrate
the problem of land and labor allocation to local goods producers.
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